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Hugo J. Nochteff* 
An industrial revolution is taking place: its nucleus is 
the electronics complex, from which will emerge a 
new technological-economic paradigm and a new 
economic, social and cultural pattern which began to 
develop about 15 years ago and which will continue 
to unfold in the coming decades. 
The appropriate use of the new technologies by 
the developing countries is made possible by the very 
trends of the diffusion of the new industrial technol-
ogy model, In fact, the trends which have been called 
"intrinsic", trends towards the concentration of 
knowledge, control and economic and political 
power, strengthened by the technological protec-
tionism of the big State and private organizations of 
the industrialized countries, are accompanied by the 
—equally necessary— diffusion trend of the new 
technologies, which is essential to the development 
of rhe new paradigm and the achievement of 
expanded reproduction. Technological knowledge is 
almost inevitably "liberated" in the course of the 
diffusion process. 
However, given the characteristics of the new 
technologies, utilization of the possibilities offered 
by the "uncontrolled" diffusion process is morediffi-
cult than in the case of earlier technologies, and it 
depends increasingly on the scientific, technological 
and industrial capacity of the semi-industrialized 
countries. The development of this capacity and its 
direction are linked to the generation of "endoge-
nous nuclei of technological dynamism" and, in gen-
eral, of policies designed essentially for the creation 
of the capacity to adapt the use of the new technolo-
gies to the needs and potential of the semi-
industrialized nations and their various social 
sectors. 
This strategy can be described as "selective link-
ing" and its central features are discussed in. this 
article. 
•UNIDO consultant and research professor at 
FLACSO, Buenos Aires. 
I 
Industrial revolution 
and technological paradigm 
There is every indication that a new industrial 
revolution is taking place, with its nucleus or key 
factor located in the electronics complex, from 
which is emerging the now dominant economic-
technological paradigm —an economic, social, 
cultural and technological pattern which began 
to be shaped about 15 years ago, is now rapidly 
consolidating itself, and will continue to unfold 
during the coming decades (Pérez, 1975; Forres-
ter, 1980). 
The industrial revolution has been defined 
in the recent literature as a profound transfor-
mation of the input-output matrix: not only are 
its internal ratios changing, but new lines and 
columns are being added as well. It has thus been 
defined as a radical and very long-term modifica-
tion of the relative-price dynamics of all produc-
tion inputs. 
The nucleus of the structure of the new 
accumulation model is a technological-economic 
complex, in this case the electronics complex, 
which constitutes the key factor in the changes in 
the input-output matrix, in relative-cost dynam-
ics, and in the determination of a new "best 
practice" frontier (Pérez, 1985 and 1986). 
The development of the technological revo-
lution is guided by a technological-economic 
paradigm (Dosi, 1982) which determines the 
main lines of the change in the new trajectories 
of invention, innovation and diffusion. This 
paradigm is consolidated in practice as a kind of 
"ideal type" —in normative rather than in 
methodological terms, for it should not be con-
fused with Weber's ideal type— of economic 
organization, which spreads out until it forms 
the body of beliefs, values and techniques shared 
by technologists, investors, managers and politi-
cal decision-makers. 
This notion has been taken from the episte-
mology and history of science, specifically from 
the scientific paradigm of Thomas Kuhn (1985). 
Both in its content and in its development, the 
technological-economic paradigm shows a 
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marked resemblance to the one formulated by 
Kuhn. As in Kuhn, it emerges when the prob-
lems which come up in practice cannot be solved 
by means of further development of the applica-
tion of the methods contained in the earlier 
paradigm and a very intense crisis results. This 
process includes the emergence of a new body of 
beliefs and practices and new key factors: the 
exemplars or models for problem-solving in the 
scientific paradigms (Borello, 1988). It promises 
success in the solution of the most important 
problems, achieved in what can be called the 
normal path, which takes the paradigm as 
matrix and trajectory of its development. 
There is every indication that the pheno-
mena described by these paradigms, and some of 
the trends predicted by their authors, have been 
empirically verified. In addition to analysing the 
theoretical validity of the concept of 
technological-economic paradigm, it is impor-
tant to emphasize two of its features, owing to 
their significance for the peripheral countries. 
First, the importance of the problems, and 
therefore the central issues which the new para-
digm promises to resolve, is not determined by 
the issues which can be called universal necessi-
ties. What counts for more is the perception of 
these problems by the leading social actors, in 
the light of the earlier paradigm and the social 
structure in which they exercise their leadership. 
Second, the normal path tends to disregard a 
priori any invention, innovation, production 
practice or modification of consumption and 
investment patterns which are not given prior-
ity by the paradigm, or —in other words— 
which are not relevant to the solution of the 
problems considered most important or central. 
The normal path follows the models of accepted 
trajectories, within which take place the pro-
cesses of innovation and diffusion, and from 
which is disseminated and confirmed the new 
common outlook of managers, investors, tech-
nologists, policy-makers, scientific institutes, 
etc. 
II 
The new paradigm, the big organizations 
of the central countries, and the 
semi-industrialized countries 
This industrial revolution, this new key factor 
and this new tech no logical-economic paradigm 
constitute the basis of the response of the big 
State and private organizations of the most 
advanced countries to the crisis which began at 
the end of the 1960s. This crisis was caused to a 
large extent by the exhaustion of the capacity of 
the earlier technological-economic paradigm to 
ensure a dynamic process of capital accumulation 
and, therefore, of expanded reproduction of 
organization capitalism. In other words, the 
industrial technology model of the post-war 
period is no longer able to guarantee the eco-
nomic and political growth of the big organiza-
tions of the most highly industrialized countries 
(Nochteff, 1987). 
The new paradigm is therefore a "product" 
of the big organizations which have generated 
and consolidated it, and its potential responds 
functionally to their requirements for economic 
and political growth. 
The crisis which shook the post-war 
technological-economic paradigm, during which 
this new industrial revolution and its key factor 
came into being, seems to have stemmed from 
the inability of technology to overcome the con-
straints imposed, on one hand, by the diminish-
ing supply and, on the other, by the increasing 
cost of raw materials, energy and labour as 
inputs in the accumulation process. In turn, the 
specific structure and dynamics of the demand 
for these inputs was largely determined by the 
production, consumption and investment 
patterns of the central economies, and by the 
specific characteristics of the prevailing pro-
cesses of production, trade and economic 
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organization —determined to a large extent by 
those of the big organizations of the central 
countries. 
The potential of the electronics complex, 
and basically of micro-electronics, which is 
making it the key factor oí the new technological 
paradigm, is closely associated with its specific 
capacity to remove or offer a promise to remove 
such constraints, in the terms used in this article, 
in order to bring about a profound change in the 
relative-price dynamics of all the inputs of the 
production process and the organizational 
system.1 
This new industrial revolution causes an 
increase in society's freedom with respect to 
natural determinants. It invests the process of 
capital accumulation with greater independence 
with respect to the constraints imposed by 
nature in general and the labour force in particu-
lar. However, the new quantum of freedom 
which society is acquiring tends to be distributed 
unequally. Given the causes of this industrial 
revolution and the social actors which generate, 
lead and develop it, it is mainly the big organiza-
tions of the advanced countries which acquire 
this independence. In other words, the unequal 
distribution of the fruits of technological pro-
gress is directly associated with the fact that the 
social matrix, headed by the big organizations of 
the central countries, establishes the structure of 
the technological-economic paradigm and the 
normal path of its development. The capacity of 
the new paradigm to solve the problems of the 
societies and organizations which generated it 
does not mean that it has to solve the problems 
of other societies. 
As suggested earlier, this trend is deter-
mined by what can be called the exclusion effect 
of the paradigm and its normal path. The nor-
mal path in its positive (or inclusive) effect, 
tends to accumulate knowledge and solutions, 
but only for handling the problems which the 
paradigm defines as such. The normal path 
creates a consensus as to what is the best produc-
tion and organizational practice, what are the 
inputs whose prices should continue to fall, or 
'A discussion of the relationship between the constraints, the 
characteristics of organization capitalism and the potential of 
micro-electronics will be found in Nochteff (1987). 
what is the desirable dynamics of the consump-
tion and investment patterns. It tends to exclude, 
to the same extent but not rigidly, the explora-
tion of technological, industrial and organiza-
tional trajectories which contradict or are 
secondary to the paradigm, or which have simply 
not been taken into account among the central 
problems and the solution options, given the 
objectives, the leading actors and the constraints 
on the accumulation model which caused the 
change of paradigm. 
These trends, which can be called "intrinsic" 
in, although not essential to, the new industrial 
revolution, seem in fact to be harmful, at least in 
relative terms, to the peripheral societies and to 
semi-industrialized societies in general, this 
latter category including Latin America. 
The effects of the development of the new 
industrial technology complexes, especially elec-
tronics, on the semi-industrialized countries can 
be described in different ways —where it has 
already been possible to make evaluations— and 
they have dissimilar economic, social and politi-
cal manifestations. Nevertheless, most of the 
studies of these effects emphasize:2 
— The loss of the independent capacity to 
determine the patterns of production, consump-
tion and income distribution; 
— The transfer of the processes of gesta-
tion, acquisition and development of new know-
ledge overseas to the big organizations of central 
countries; 
— The widening income gap between the 
most advanced and the semi-industrialized coun-
tries resulting from their different capacity for 
capital accumulation and economic develop-
ment, which stems mainly from the importance 
of science and technology, concentrated in the 
most advanced countries, as inputs in the pro-
duction process; 
— The decline of the labour market, with 
the disappearance of the specialized and best-
paid occupations (skilled workers and techni-
2This list is a summary and simplification of the effects 
discussed in the literature on this topic. Among this literature, 
reference may be made to such works as: Minian (1986), Ernst 
(1984), Antonelli (1981), Hoffman and Rush (1980), Leppan 
(1983), Kaplinsky (1985), Rada (1980a and 1980b),Seers (1984), 
UNCTC (1984) and Ernst (1980). 
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cians; and in some countries scientists and 
technologists as well); 
— The concentration of economic power in 
transnational corporations; 
— The exacerbation of the structural trends 
towards disequilibrium in the external sector of 
the economy; 
— The trend towards the transformation of 
the industrial technology system into a set of 
"enclaves" whose activities bear little relation-
ship to the needs and characteristics of the peri-
pheral societies but are instead increasingly 
controlled by transnational corporations; 
— The location of activities of declining 
value added in the semi-industrialized countries; 
However, these intrinsic trends should not be 
regarded as inevitable and necessary laws. The 
Latin American societies and the various social 
actors can jointly determine the way in which 
this industrial revolution will affect them, if 
indeed they actively influence the methods by 
which the new technologies are incorporated, 
adapting and developing them in the light of 
their own needs and their economic, social and 
political potential. 
The appropriate use of the new technologies 
is made possible by the very characteristics of the 
diffusion of the new industrial technology mod-
els. In fact, the so-called "intrinsic" trends 
towards the concentration of knowledge, control 
and economic and political power, strengthened 
by the technological protectionism of the big 
State and private organizations of the advanced 
countries, are accompanied by —equally 
necessary— trends towards the development of 
a new paradigm and attainment of expanded 
reproduction and towards the diffusion of the 
new technologies. Technological knowledge is 
almost inevitably "liberated" during this diffu-
sion process. This phenomenon takes place in 
various ways which do not need to be listed and 
— Exogenous decís ion-making concerning 
the restructuring of activities, with respect both 
to technology and production and to the growth 
process; 
— The increasing inequality of income 
üstribution. 
These phenomena are no strangers to the 
region's economies. On the contrary, they have 
been features of the Latin American societies at 
least since the end of the Second World War 
(Fajnzylber, 1985). The so-called intrinsic 
"trends" of this industrial revolution are there-
fore creating new problems for the region, but 
they are also, and more importantly, exacerbat-
ing the existing ones. 
discussed in detail here. The sale of micro-
electronic components not installed in equip-
ment results from the need to achieve increasing 
economies of scale and absorb the cost of 
research and development and of capital, the 
proliferation of "silicon chips", the speed with 
which "clones" are developed and forced and 
accelerated obsolescence are some of the mani-
festations of this process of "uncontrolled" 
diffusion. 
However, given the characteristics of the 
new technologies, it is more difficult to take 
advantage of the opportunities offered by the 
process of "uncontrolled" diffusion than in the 
case of the earlier technologies, and this depends 
increasingly on the scientific, technological and 
industrial capacity of the semi-industrialized 
countries. 
In terms of the normal path of the new 
paradigm, this capacity is essential to the utiliza-
tion of radical innovations and the adoption of 
innovation, dissemination and development 
policies which can solve problems different from 
the ones given priority by the central countries. 
The generation of scientific and technological 
know-how in Latin America is therefore neces-
III 
Conditions and proposals for an alternative 
strategy 
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sary for two reasons: first, to take proper advan-
tage of the products of the normal path of the 
new paradigm; second, to offset what we have 
called here the exclusion effect of the normal 
path. This latter task implies to some extent the 
creation of a partial alternative paradigm, for it 
will require the identification of central prob-
lems different from the ones defined as such in 
the dominant technological-economic paradigm. 
The development of this capacity and its 
direction are connected with the generation of 
so-called "endogenous nuclei of technological 
dynamism" (ECLAC-UNIDO, 1985) and, in gen-
eral, with the design of policies whose main goal 
is the creation of the capacity to use the new 
technologies to satisfy the needs and potential of 
the semi-industrialized nations and their various 
social sectors. This is the meaning of the word 
"endogenous" and, at the same time, the basis of 
its importance. In short, it is a question of gener-
ating capacities which cater to the needs which 
each society and each social sector regards as 
pertinent and urgent, and of taking advantage of 
the dissemination of the new paradigm to utilize 
these capacities and satisfy these needs. This 
means that the application of the concepts of 
efficacy —defined as the means of achieving 
ends— and of efficiency —defined as the means 
of achieving the ends with the lowest expendi-
ture of resources— is linked to those ends, which 
can be determined only by the social actors them-
selves. This means therefore that the goals of the 
introduction of new technology and the develop-
ment of the economy and industry, and the most 
efficacious and efficient means of achieving 
these goals, cannot be determined by the big 
organizations or by reference to the "state of the 
art" as defined by the most advanced countries. 
In other words, if it is held that the moderniza-
tion of the production apparatus and technologi-
cal development consist of something distinct 
from "window-dressing modernization" and the 
mere transmission of exogenous stimuli, then 
'this modernization must be closely associated 
with the democratization of scientific, techno-
logical and production decision-making. 
Political and social issues, and indeed the 
distribution of freedom and power among social 
actors, are therefore inseparable from the 
technological-economic models. If the incorpo-
ration of these models takes place without prior 
democratic debate or without regard to the goals 
of the social actors, this will in fact confirm the 
technological determinism which characterizes, 
with varying degrees of explicitness, much of the 
recent literature on these topics. It is therefore 
vitally important to stress that this determinism 
is merely an ideological expression of the actual 
determination, by the big organizations of the 
most advanced countries, both of the social ends 
and of the means of achieving them. 
The identification of priority problems for 
Latin America and the satisfaction of the needs 
of the majority of its population, the creation of 
scientific capacities for an alternative paradigm 
and normal path, and the creation of endogenous 
nuclei of technological dynamism also imply 
alternative types of engagement with the cen-
tres. In general terms, it implies a strategy of 
selective linking to the world market and the big 
organizations of the central countries, for the 
dominant paradigm is disseminated and consoli-
dated through consumption and investment 
patterns, foreign trade, new notions of best prac-
tice and the common outlook of investors, tech-
n o l o g i s t s , m a n a g e r s and po l i t i c a l 
decision-makers. To the extent that exogenous 
factors and the exogenously determined incor-
poration of the dominant paradigm produce 
negative effects and lead to the reproduction of 
an unsuitable, imitative, truncated and socially 
exclusive accumulation model, selectivity in the 
linking of the Latin American economies to the 
central countries becomes a decisive factor in the 
economic and social development strategy. 
Some of the main lines of a strategy of selec-
tive linking are listed in the following 
paragraphs:5 
— Development of technological and pro-
duction capacities which facilitate the increasing 
use of new technologies and the selection of 
technologies, goods and production options 
most suited to the economic, social and political 
'The background of the concept of selective linking may be 
found in the works on Selective Dix engagement by Ward 
Morehouse, especially (1979); and on Decoupling Policy by Juan 
Rada, especially (1982). For a discussion of the problems of the 
exogenously determined incorporation of technology in Latin 
America, see the works by Eugenio Lanera and Hugo Nochteff 
which take up the notion of "selective endogenization", especially 
<1982). 
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development of each society, it being understood 
that "suitable" means those which respond most 
efficiently to the needs of the various social 
actors, but primarily to the priority needs of the 
majority of the population; 
— Where demand is concerned, definition 
of the most efficient consumption pattern in 
terms of the needs, and therefore of the demo-
cratically determined social goals, rather than by 
reference to the dominant pattern in other socie-
ties or in the international market or to the 
standard patterns explicit or implicit in the mod-
els produced in the big organizations, including 
the scientific organizations, of the advanced 
countries; 
— Where supply is concerned, determina-
tion of the most efficient industrial technology 
pattern with respect to the demand pattern 
referred to above, the potential of each society, 
and the preferences of the majority of the eco-
nomically active population as to working condi-
tions, types of job qualification and the control 
and characteristics of the work process in 
general; 
— Identification, in the light of the above, of 
the most suitable technologies available in the 
international market with a view to copying, 
adapting or developing them, and determination 
of the forms of incorporation and engagement in 
the international market in the light of the con-
cepts of suitability and efficiency described 
earlier; 
— At the same time, introduction of a policy 
of co-operation and complementarity with 
respect to technology, production and foreign 
trade between societies which have similar or 
complementary needs and potentials and which 
are endeavouring to develop strategies of the 
same kind and with similar goals. It must be 
stressed that in the form in which it is usually 
presented and in which it has been experienced 
by some countries of the region, the model of 
external openness is an ideological one. A stra-
tegy of selective linking is not a "pass key"; the 
degree of an economy's liberalization in foreign 
trade —understood strictly as the foreign-trade 
coefficient— can be smaller or much larger than 
the level produced by the liberalization model. 
But the content of the trade flows is different, 
just as the societies of the trading partners are 
different. A selective linking model, based on 
increasing technological and industrial integra-
tion, can also generate export flows of increasing 
added value. In view of the effect of the control of 
the consumption pattern and the integration of 
the production network, together with the kind 
of exports mentioned above, the model will have 
a positive effect on the external sector; 
— Design of a science and technology policy 
in which the concepts of technological gaps and 
obsolescence refer primarily to the needs of each 
individual society, to its capacities and to its 
democratically established social goals, and not 
to the technologies and areas of research prevail-
ing in the most advanced countries or in the 
international market; 
— Tendency, with respect to the technolo-
gies and goods regarded as of greatest impor-
tance from the social standpoint and from the 
standpoint of the country's technological and 
industrial development, for the domestic pro-
duct cycle to adjust to the needs and possibilities 
of the national economy rather than to the logic 
of the domestic markets of advanced countries or 
to the logic of the trade between those countries; 
— Adoption of product-quality criteria 
which, in addition to upgrading quality require-
ments, give priority to the products' useful life 
and ease of maintenance, and to the suitability of 
the benefits they deliver (or their technical spec-
ifications) in terms of the country's resources, 
rather than to the quantity and novelty of the 
products or their similarity to the products 
offered in the most advanced countries; 
— Introduction and development of new 
technologies, primarily in order to satisfy the 
people's basic needs and to bring consumption 
and investment patterns into line with the 
requirements and potential of the Latin Ameri-
can countries. This control of patterns must be 
accompanied by improved productivity and com-
petitiveness, in order to prevent the continua-
tion of the structural bias towards deficits in the 
external sector. 
The reconciliation of objectives requires the 
introduction of new technologies to satisfy basic 
needs through increasing productivity. This 
must also be achieved in the sectors of "non-
tradeable" goods and services in order indirectly 
to reduce the costs of the sectors of "tradeable" 
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goods and services. This reconciliation also 
requires an increment, by means of technological 
and organizational change, in the productivity of 
the sectors which, in each case, are less engaged 
in the international market and therefore less 
exposed to external competition, and an incre-
ment in the competitiveness of the sectors, 
product lines or market sectors which are less 
engaged in foreign trade, especially those in 
which the aim is to achieve a higher export 
coefficient.4 All this implies, of course, the devel-
opment of the capacity for creation and efficient 
use of technology. The Latin American expe-
rience indicates that the massive and indiscrimi-
nate incorporation of new "pioneering" 
technologies and plants has led to reduced effi-
ciency in many cases, especially in services, to the 
detriment of the competitiveness of "tradeable" 
goods. 
— Diffusion, from the endogenous nuclei of 
technological dynamism, of the most efficient 
and suitable methods of incorporating new tech-
nologies. The internationalization of technolog-
ical know-how makes it possible to keep down 
the cost of new plant, use it in the most efficient 
manner and incorporate it within a framework 
of suitable organizational changes. The efficient 
incorporation of new technologies depends 
directly on technological capacity and independ-
ence. This fact, together with increased effi-
ciency in the incorporation of new plant within a 
framework of simultaneous, or even prior, 
organizational changes is demonstrated both at 
the microeconomic level and throughout the 
whole economy, not only in the region but also in 
more advanced countries. 
The foregoing considerations are some of 
the elements of a selective strategy which seeks 
to ensure that the determination of the patterns 
of consumption, supply and technological and 
industrial development is consistent not only 
industrial efficiency and international competitiveness are 
not perfect synonyms. In addition to issues of market conforma-
tion, it must be remembered that in the case of most manufactured 
goods competitiveness entails not only industrial efficiency but 
also requirements of design, delivery, packaging, etc., associated 
with the differentiation of products. On the other hand, lack of 
with exogenously generated trends but also, and 
to the greatest extent possible, with endogenous 
needs and goals. 
Of course, it is an essential requirement for 
the design and introduction of a strategy of this 
kind that the design and introduction of the 
scientific, technological and industrial policies 
should be determined and controlled in a demo-
cratic manner by means of the directest possible 
participation by all the social actors, but espe-
cially by the majority of the population, in the 
decision-making and control machinery. 
One of the necessary conditions of the viabil-
ity of this democratization process ¡s a public 
debate, in the widest sense of the term, about the 
matters which have been discussed in this article. 
A fundamental element in this debate, on which 
the degree of freedom of the social actors 
depends to a large extent, is the adoption of a 
critical attitude towards the issues raised by this 
new industrial revolution and by science and 
technology in general. In other words, criticism 
must be a central element of education, espe-
cially in technological subjects. It appears 
increasingly necessary to "unlearn" what is 
taught through the innumerable media, not only 
the mass media, which range from direct sales 
brochures and advertisements to the fairly com-
plicated literature of diffusion concerning the 
intrinsic virtues of the new technologies. 
Latin America's historical neglect of scien-
tific and technological issues, and of the informa-
tion, or rather, disinformation which is 
disseminated on a mass scale, tends to create an 
uncritical attitude to matters of technological 
change. This is reflected at very different levels, 
ranging from State decisions on matters involv-
ing technological change to the continuing lack 
of interest on the part of most of the population 
in discussion of scientific and technological deci-
sions and in demanding participation in them. 
competitiveness in the international market does not necessarily 
imply low productivity. In other words, it is possible to produce 
goods and services which are uncompetitive internationally (in 
terms of design, performance, etc.) but which are nevertheless very 
efficient. 
32 CEPAL REVIEW No. 36 / December 1988 
Bibliography 
Antonelli, C. (1981): Transborder Data Flows and International 
Business • A Pilot Study, OECD, Paris. 
Borello, R. ( 1988) : "La discusión epistemológica actual". Realidad 
económica, No. 80, first bimonthly issue. 
Dosi, G. (1982): "Technological paradigms and technological 
trajectories". Research Policy, vol. 11, No. 3, 1982. 
ECLAC-UNIDO, Joint Division (1985): Industrialización y des-
arrollo tecnológico. Report No. 1. 
Ernst, D. (1980): The New International Division of Labour, 
Technology and Underdevelopment. Consequences for the 
Third World. Frankfurt, Campus Verlag. 
( 1984): "Los efectos de la microelectrónica en la reestructu-
ración mundial de la industria electrómica. Consecuencias 
para el Tercer Mundo". Comercio exterior, vol. 34, No. 12, 
December. 
(1985): Automation, Employment and the Third World, 
The Hague. 
Fajnzylber, F. (1985): La industrialización trunca de América 
Latina. Ed. Nueva Imagen, Mexico. 
Forrester, T. (1980): The Microelectronics Revolution. The Com-
plete Guide to the Technology and its Impact on Society. Basil 
Blackwell, Oxford. 
Hoffman, H and H. Rush (1980): "Microelectronics, industry and 
the Third World". Futures, IPC Business Press. 
Kaplinsky, R. (1985): "Electronics-based automation technologies 
and the onset of system manufacture. Implications for Third 
World industrialization". World Development, vol. 13, 
No. 3, March. 
Kuhn, T. (1985): La estructura de las revoluciones científicas, 
Fondo de Cultura Económica, Mexico. Originally published in 
English in 1962. 
Lahera, E. and H. Nochteff (1982): La microelectrónica y el 
desarrollo de América Latina. Problemas y posibilidades de 
acción. CEPAL/R.317. 
Leppan, E.D. (1983): A Literature Survey and Partially Annotated 
Bibliography on the Impact of Microelectronics on the Third 
World. IDRC, Canada. 
Minian, I. (1986): Industrias nuevas y estrategias de desarrollo en 
América Latina, CIDE, Mexico. 
Morehouse, W. (1978): Technological Autonomy and Delinking in 
the International System: an Alternative Economic and Polit-
ical Strategy for National Development, UN1TAR, New 
York. 
Nochteff, H, ( 1987): Revolución tecnológica, autonomía nacional y 
democracia, FLACSO, Buenos Aires. 
Pérez, C. (1985): "Microelectronics, long waves and world structu-
ral change: new perspectives for developing countries". 
World Development, vol. 13, No. 3, March. 
(1986): Las nuevas tecnologías, una visión de conjunto. La 
tercera revolución industrial. Impactos internacionales del 
actual viraje. C. Omínami (éd.), RIAL-GEL, Buenos Aires. 
Rada, J. (1980a): The Impact of Microelectronics, ILO, Geneva. 
(1980b): The Impact of Microelectronics and Information 
Technology. Reference to Brazil, Argentina and Bolivia, 
UNESCO. 
( 1982): "A Third World perspective". Microelectronics and 
Society. For Better or for Worse, Friedrichs, G. and A. Schaff 
(1982), Pergamon Press. 
Seers, D. (1984): Dependence Theory. A Critical Reassessment, 
Frances Pinter, UNCTC, London. 
UNCTC ( 1984): Informe sobre las estrategias y políticas globales de 
las sociedades transnacionales en la industria de la compu-
tación; consecuencias para los países en desarrollo. 
